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Abstract. With the advent of smart grids, distribution utilities have
initiated a large deployment of smart meters on the premises of the
consumers. The enormous amount of data obtained from the consumers
and communicated to the utility give new perspectives and possibili-
ties for various analytics-based applications. In this paper the current
smart metering-based energy-theft detection schemes are reviewed and
discussed according to two main distinctive categories: A) system state-
based, and B) artificial intelligence-based.
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1 Introduction
As power demand increases in modern societies, the need for an advanced and re-
liable power grid becomes increasingly imperative. In fact, the traditional power
grid, which is still remarkably based on a design already existing for more than
100 years, can no longer satisfy the present-day needs and requirements [1]. The
current emergence of smart grids aims to increase the reliability, quality and se-
curity of supply, especially in the face of the increased penetration by renewable
energy sources in the form of distributed generation [2]. The concept of a smart
grid has also come into existence, bringing into the state-of-the-art scope relative
advancements in information systems and communication technologies, one of
whose cornerstones is the present large-scale deployment in many countries of
advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) in order to upgrade the aging energy
metering system [3].
One of the principal problems which impacts the efficiency and security of the
power distribution networks are the power losses occurring within the process
of delivering energy to the consumer. These losses can be decomposed into two
categories: i) Technical losses (i.e. losses due to naturally occurring phenomena
in the power system, such as power dissipation within transmission lines and
transformers), and ii) Non-technical losses (NTL), which can be attributed to
the following reasons: a) Actions of utility employees or an operator, such as
administrative losses due to accounting errors and record keeping, b) Customer
theft, c) Customer non-payment, and d) Theft by non-customers [4].
A critical issue for the distribution utility is that NTL cannot be precisely
calculated, only global losses; they are usually estimated as the difference be-
tween the total amount of energy fed into the distribution system and the total
amount of energy recorded as sold to customers [5]. The excess of unbilled energy
is energy that is not scheduled or expected by the utility, thus it can severely
affect the power system operation [6]. Critical operational problems that may
arise include overloads of generation units and the stressing of network equip-
ment due to congestion and/or over-voltages. These result from the fact that
the utility cannot schedule sufficient active and reactive power due to system
dynamic uncertainty and insufficient load flow information. Furthermore, these
over-loadings can have an impact on the equipment of honest consumers. In ex-
treme cases of excess unplanned load, blackouts and brownouts may also occur.
Concerning the distribution utilities, apart from the directly incurred economic
losses as a consequence of purchasing energy that is not billed for, maintenance
costs also increase due to the aforementioned stressing of the equipment. Hence,
NTL deprive utilities from investing in the upgrading of their equipment. Last
but not least, the environmental impact of NTL is also considerable due to the
increase in CO2 emissions (the price signal is not considered in the defrauder
decisions). A 10% reduction in NTL in India (around 83,000 GWh) would result
in 9.2 million tons CO2 reduction annually [7].
The nature of NTL poses serious challenges to utility companies in detecting
dishonest customers. It should also be pointed out that technical losses are cor-
related with NTL, since the delivery of unbilled energy creates further physical
losses on the power system. Thus minimizing NTL contributes to the overall
reduction of power losses. ENEL, the Italian electricity utility, was motivated
to initiate a large scale roll-out of smart meter-based infrastructure in order to
minimize NTL of their distribution network. After the installation of smart me-
ters (SMs) on the consumers’ premises, the theft hit-rate raised from 5% to 50%
[9]. This massive deployment of SMs is now extended to Spain, being facilitated
by Endesa -one of the Spanish distribution utilities- with 6.8 m SMs and 77,000
concentrators having been installed by the end of December 2015. The data
provided by the SM devices give a new perspective and unveil numerous pos-
sibilities to develop efficient and effective theft detection methods. Research in
this respect has recently shown significant progress. As a result, the authors felt
motivated to investigate and present in this paper the state-of-the-art in NTL
detection methods within the framework of AMI, including artificial-intelligence
techniques.
An important part of the implementation of an AMI is the replacement of
the legacy mechanical meters with SMs. The bidirectional communication capa-
bility of the SM allows remote meter data-reading, recording of higher resolution
measurements, as well as outage reporting. SM and AMI data analysis remains
a challenging task for several reasons. Support databases with SM data ”as is”,
is infeasible over long time periods due to storage limitations. Those data are
processed, depending on the purpose of their use, and compressed before storage.
The compression may result in precision reduction of data, which could poten-
tially be useful for future re-analysis. Additionally, real- or nearly real-time data
processing can be computationally heavy and resource-consuming. Last but not
least, detailed measurements from SMs allow the utility companies to extract
the consumer load profile, which is considered sensitive private data and even
forbidden by some regulations. There are confidentiality issues arising, with the
possibility that such private information can be sold to third-parties such as
insurance companies, marketing companies etc. Moreover the consumers may
become easier targets for criminals, such as burglars that can infer the victim’s
daily habits by analyzing their load profile [8].
2 NTL Detection Techniques
There are various ways that the data retrieved from SMs have been analyzed
and exploited in order to detect NTL. Existing methods are categorized in this
paper in three groups: system state-based, artificial-intelligence-based and game-
theory based. In this review we will not consider the last one (see [4, 19] for more
information).
2.1 System state-based methods
These methods are based on the coherence of data measured by SMs with re-
spect to the data collected from the network (probably performed on a rou-
tine basis by the distribution system operator) and the features of the network
(topology and line parameters). Chen et al. present in [10] an electricity anti-
theft method based on state estimation (SE) algorithm [11], using redundant
data from SM. It is claimed that whichever the technology of stealing may be,
the method is applicable. Other advantages of this method include small-scale
investment, wide-area and real-time monitoring. It is also suggested that con-
sidering that the false voltage, current, or power measurements due to stealing
are the bad measurements, then for a limited-size network its status can be
estimated with high accuracy, while at the same time localization of the elec-
tricity theft point can be achieved. The method was tested on a 10 kV medium
voltage (MV) network. However, the authors claim that the theoretical model
can be applied on 400 V low voltage (LV) networks as well. A power balanc-
ing is initially performed to determine whether there is really need to further
investigate a feeder. If the difference between the total of power supply and
the sold power exceeds a threshold, then the following methodology is applied.
The collected three-phase real-time voltage, current, active and reactive power
measurements at the MV/LV transformers are used as inputs to a weighted-
least-squares (WLS) three-phase state estimation algorithm. This is applied in
order to estimate the loading of the distribution transformer. Note that it was
considered that the phases are decoupled in ungrounded MV networks. If the
deviation of the estimation from the measurement is greater than a threshold,
this suggests the existence of possible electricity theft. No results were presented
to validate the performance of the method Another SE approach is developed
by Huang et al. in [12, 9] for almost real-time localization of irregular energy
consumption and NTL reduction. However, in [9] the SE is complemented with
an analysis-of-variance (ANOVA) model, constituting a more detailed two-stage
approach. The first-stage includes the implementation of the MV-level SE, as in
[12], for load estimation of the MV/LV distribution transformer. This stage aims
to identify feeders with tampered or defective meters. Abnormalities within the
feeder level in electricity consumption are determined by examining a measure
of overall fitting of the estimates to pseudo-measurements on the feeder bus,
calculated by aggregated customer data from SM at the MV/LV transformers.
Following this phase, ANOVA is performed in order to distinguish suspect cus-
tomers with abnormal measurements records. A WLS-based, three-phase polar
form SE algorithm is implemented to estimate the MV/LV distribution trans-
former load. This algorithm requires, aside from the network parameters and
configuration: a) the hourly LV bus voltage and demand data from SMs at the
points of power delivery (aggregated to provide pseudo-measurements at the LV
side of the MV/LV transformer), b) outage management system (OMS) data,
and c) customer information system (CIS) data in order to examine customer
connectivity and construct the feeder framework. When the estimates from the
SE are obtained, irregular usage at the distribution transformer level is detected
via the examination of the normalized residuals at the point of delivery. Fol-
lowing the identification of bad data, the corresponding LV network is closely
investigated by applying ANOVA. To this purpose, for all consumers that belong
to that network, their load baseline curves (as estimated by old data dating back
a few weeks) are compared with curves obtained by recent SM measurements.
The aforementioned method was validated using data from a typical distribution
feeder of the Taiwan Power Company. Several NTL cases are demonstrated: a)
defective SM with zero reading, b) defective SM with higher reading, and c)
electricity theft. The SE was able to identify in every case the bad measure-
ment data. Moreover, when they were replaced by their estimates and the SE
was run again, the results were very accurate and close to the actual values.
For the ANOVA, two datasets, one of normal and one of fraudulent customers
were used, of 8 hours and their baselines for 3 weeks were considered. The model
distinguished which was the fraudulent dataset from the 5 ones. Niemira et al.
in [13] implement a SE model to detect malicious data attacks by comparing the
active and reactive power measurement residuals of a nonlinear SE with those
of a linear one (DC model). The main difference of the proposed SE from the
traditional ones is that it is designed not only to handle random sensor noise or
errors, but also isolated, random bad data. It is assumed that the attacker has
partial knowledge of the topology, such as a column of the Jacobian H (which
is constant for the DC SE), to prepare an attack measurement vector z. Then,
his own measurement and a suitable subset of measurements are modified so as
to leave DC residuals unchanged. DC models disregard losses, uneven voltage
profiles and reactive power. Thus, if a measurement vector designed for a DC
SE is used with an AC one, there will be an increase in the residuals. Baseline
residuals are required for comparison with the current residuals. A 24-bus IEEE
network was used to examine the performance of the model. When Monte Carlo
noise was added to real measurements, in order to produce data for baseline
construction, it was concluded that the active power injection residues of the
generators are impacted the most by the attack. Weckx et al. in [14] propose
a linearized load flow algorithmic approach using SM data for electricity theft
detection via illegal connections, when line lengths are unknown or uncertain. At
the same time, basic information of the topology can be extracted and the phase
of consumers can be identified in an automatic way. The LV, three-phase, four-
wire, radial distribution networks are considered. Active and reactive power, as
well as voltage magnitudes, are the required measurements from the SMs to be
used in the linear model for the execution of this algorithm:
Vh,k = V
0
k +
N∑
h˜=1
ah,h˜Ph˜,k +
N∑
h˜=1
bh,h˜Qh˜,k , (1)
where k is the time step, h the hth residential consumer and N the total number
of houses; V 0k is the voltage magnitude at the LV side of the MV/LV transformer,
Ph˜,k and Qh˜,k the active and reactive power of the consumer h˜ at time step k
respectively, and ah,h˜ and bh,h˜ the influence factors of the active and reactive
power respectively of consumer h˜ on the voltage magnitude of consumer h.
If there are historical measurements from SMs which are free from fraud,
then ah,h˜ and bh,h˜ in 1 can be considered as the unknowns and an ordinary least
squares problem is defined. After the influence factors have been determined,
then the voltage at each consumer premises can be calculated from (1), using
new measurements from SMs that possibly entail electricity theft and can then
be compared with the voltage measurement of the SM.
The parameters ah,h˜ and bh,h˜ are also indicators of the relative location of the
SM and the phase they are connected to. If the SM h is connected at the same
phase as the h˜ the parameter ah,h˜ will be negative since the active power has
created a voltage drop. If it is connected to another phase, then the parameter
will have a low positive value.
The results of this approach were validated with the simulation of a LV, 4-
wire residential feeder in Flanders with 32 customers. The first customer was
far away from the substation and the feeder does not have side branches. 1000
steps were required to calculate the influence factors and the identification of the
phases was successful. A comparison between the errors of an exact load flow with
a 10% uncertainty of cable lengths and the linearized one with unknown cable
lengths is also presented; the second case study was found to yield significantly
smaller errors (less than 1 V).
In [15] Berrisford describes, within the context of electricity theft detection
via SM data, a linear programming optimization method to confirm the network
topology by estimating the feeder section impedances, and to provide estimates
for the MV/LV transformer LV-side voltage, which in many cases is not mea-
sured. The algorithm uses hourly load and voltage measurements. The main
idea behind this algorithm is that the voltage of the transformer is equal to the
sum of the voltage of any SM and the voltage drop from the transformer to
the SM. A set of equations, as many as the SMs, estimating the voltage of the
transformer can be formed. The unknown variables in these equations are the
line impedances since there are measurements for the SM voltages and active
powers. The criterion to obtain the most accurate values for the impedances is
the minimization of the transformer voltage variance. This is achieved by using
linear programming. When there is theft at a SM, the model exhibits poor con-
vergence. In the simulation, a virtual unknown load with known impedance was
added parallel to the irregular SM to represent theft, and the model converged
in this case. The method was tested on two transformers of BC Hydro in Canada
for hourly measurements of 4 weeks providing promising results. During the first
week, for transformer A, the mean standard deviation (MSD) was 0.016% for
voltage. The line impedance estimates were consistent for about 4 weeks testing,
which implies that the model is accurate. Transformer B had a 0.437 V MSD.
This was attributed to the fact that one of the SM had a completely different
voltage trend, and it was concluded that it belonged to another transformer.
After the SM was removed the MSD was 0.315 V but it was observed that for
2 SM the estimates were not in step with the others. At this point, the virtual
load to model theft was added and the MSD decreased to 0.092 V.
Salinas et al. in [16], taking into account customers privacy preserving, pro-
pose three distributed algorithms based on peer-to-peer computing in order to
calculate customers ”honesty coefficients”. The distributed LU and QR decom-
positions are employed to solve a linear system of equations (LSE) while preserv-
ing each node’s information. For a small network, LU decomposition (LUD) can
localize the thieves: unfortunately, the same methodology can prove to be unsta-
ble for large networks. For the latter ones, LUD with partial pivoting (LUDP) is
implemented, as well as QR decomposition (QRD). The aforementioned methods
are applied in cases with constant fraud. In addition to this case, adaptive LUD,
LUDP and QUD for scenarios with variable theft activity are also presented.
Those algorithms are intended to be implemented in the SM firmware. An
assumption that there is a SM at the concentrator is made, in order to know the
overall energy consumption of an area. For a neighborhood with n consumers, let
SP be the sampling time, pti,j and P¯ti the recorded energy consumption by the
user j at time ti and the overall consumption recorded at the concentrator level
respectively, and kj the honesty coefficient of the j customer such that kjpti,j
gives the actual energy consumption of jth customer for the time period ti. The
sum of all consumers’ actual energy at time ti should be equal to the energy
consumption at the concentrator level, thus
k1pti,1 + k2pti,2 + . . .+ knpti,n = P¯ti (2)
The aim is to determine the kj coefficients. If kj = 1 then the customer is
considered honest, if kj > 1 then the recorded energy from that SM is lower
than the realized one, and the customer is characterized as fraudulent, and if
0 < kj < 1 then the recorded energy is more than the consumed one, suggesting
that this SM is defective. With n equations like (i.e. energy measurements for n
points in time), a LSE is formed:
Pk = P¯ , (3)
where the jth column of P is the recorded energy of the jth SM. Then the data
in P are factorized in a lower triangular matrix L and an upper triangular matrix
U , so that P = LU . A new system is then derived:
Ly = P¯ (4)
Uk = y (5)
The L, U and y are collaboratively and sequentially calculated by the SMs. For
this task, the concentrator has to transmit P¯tj+1 to each SM while each SM
calculates only one column of L and y. In order to perform this task it needs
the previously calculated columns of these matrices to be transmitted to it by
the previous SM. Then backward substitution is used to determine the honesty
coefficients kj . Each SM sends to the previous one the product of one column of
U and the calculated honesty coefficient. Additionally, each SM encrypts kj using
the concentrator’s public key and the concentrator decrypts all the kj after the
LSE has been solved and the fraudulent SM locations are identified. The LUDP
is based on partial pivoting which refers to the exchange of rows of the P matrix
in order to arrange all the elements with the greatest absolute value in each
column in the diagonal positions. In comparison to LUD, this algorithm requires
greater execution time. The QRD algorithm decomposes P into an orthogonal
matrix Q (Q−1 = QT ) and an upper triangular matrix R, so that,
Rk = QT P¯ (6)
The adaptive LUD, LUDP and QRD algorithms consider variable honesty co-
efficients. In the area of n consumers, it is assumed that each one may commit
fraud with the same probability p. If X is the total number of energy thieves
in the area, then X is a random variable with a binomial distribution. When
the concentrator decrypts k, it can find the elements that are not equal to 1,
denoted as Y , and thus it can calculate the probability of this event happening:
P (X = Y ) =
(
n
Y
)
pY (1− p)n−Y (7)
Then, if the customer j commits fraud with different probability pj , X is a
random variable with an expectation E[X] =
∑n
j=1 pj . By setting a thresh-
old, the concentrator can decide whether a k is valid or not if P is lower than
the threshold in which case the SP is reduced, and the process is repeated
until the obtained k is the same as the previous one. The performance of the
algorithms was verified with simulations where the power measurements were
generated using some surveys. LUD performed well with 15 and 30 users with
constant honesty coefficients but with 50 users it became unstable, QRD and
LUDP however gave good results with 50 users. With variable coefficients, LUD
is stable for 25 users and LUDP, QRD performed well even with 100, 200 and
300 users. Lo and Ansari in [17] deal with false data injection (FDI) attacks
by suggesting the combination sum of energy profiles (CONSUMER) attack,
involving a number of consumers’ SM aiming to achieve a lower consumption
record for the attacker and a higher one for the other consumers. The proposed
CONSUMER attack model minimizes the number of the violated SMs. This de-
tection technique is based on a grid-sensor placement algorithm that provides
increased monitoring to achieve higher hit-rates. In this work, it is assumed that
grid operators have complete knowledge of the network topology while radial
networks are considered. Let H denote the network configuration matrix, z a set
of measurements z = [PG, P1, P2, . . . , Pi]
T where PG is the power at the supply
point and Pi the power measured by the SM. It is assumed that no irregularities
are detected by the traditional bad data detectors. The attacker is considered
to have knowledge of H and the state estimation error. With this information,
the attacker can build a strategy such that for the normalized residuals applies
‖zb −Hxˆb‖ = ‖z −Hxˆ‖ < δ, where δ is a pre-determined threshold, zb and xb
are respectively the measurement and state vectors modified by the attacker.
A vector c is designed such that xˆb = xˆ + c and a vector a can be fabricated
so that zb = z + a = [P¯G, P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯i]
T 6= 0 and a = [aG, a1, a2, . . . , ai]T ,∑
∀i∈NSM ai = aG = 0, where NSM is the number of SMs in the examined area.
In other words, there are load alterations, and some ai values will be negative,
thus the corresponding SM will exhibit lower energy consumption, and some will
be positive by the same overall amount; these will refer to the compromised SMs.
The state estimation performed by the grid operators cannot detect the linear
alteration of a. The proposed intrusion detection system with power information
requires sensor placement across the distribution network. These sensors are of
a more simplified design in comparison to SMs, and they belong to the utility.
They build a sensor network which is less vulnerable to attacks, as it is designed
for grid monitoring. The data of the SMs will be compared with the ones ob-
tained from these sensors. In order to avoid placing sensors in all grid nodes
and having an over-determined system, an algorithm that identifies the optimal
nodes where sensors should be located is presented. Han et al. in [18] propose a
NTL Fraud Detection (NFD) method based solely on data obtained from SMs;
no other information of the consumers is required. The criterion used to identify
dishonest customers is the difference between the billed energy and the realized
consumption. Assuming that technical losses have been estimated by the util-
ity company and excluded, there is also a SM at the distribution transformer
recording the overall energy supplied to n customers in a neighborhood. Let Ej
denote the energy measured at the distribution transformer and Ei,j the actual
energy at the ith SM, and xi,j the electricity reported to the utility by the ith
SM. By performing energy balance, considering that the technical losses have
been calculated and removed, yields
Ej =
n∑
i=1
Ei,j (8)
If the consumer is honest, then Ei,j/xi,j ≈ 1; for a dishonest customer |Ei,j/xi,j−
1| will be very large. For each SM an accuracy coefficient is defined as ai,j =
Ei,j/xi,j . While the reported energy is available, the actual values are not. There
is a function for each SM such that fi(xi,j) = Ei,j , j = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Based
on Taylor approximation fi(x) =
∑o
k=m ak,ix
k. By replacing the previous two
equations in (8) yields
Ej =
n∑
i=1
o∑
k=m
ak,ix
k
i,j (9)
With m samples of xk for each SM and Ej known, the accuracy coefficients
can be estimated. Simulations were performed to examine the performance of
the model.
2.2 Artificial Intelligence-based
Artificial Intelligence-based theft detection techniques are the most popular ones,
since they were available to use before the deployment of SMs, and because
now they can further advance and improve remarkably within the framework
of SMs. These methods usually refer to the classification of the consumers load
profile. The aim is to determine irregular patterns in the electricity consumption
over time, based on a training dataset that includes normal and irregular cases.
The main steps followed in a classification approach are: a) data acquisition, b)
data preprocessing, c) feature selection, d) classifier training, e) data-of-interest
classification, f) data post-processing, and g) theft-suspects identification.
Nagi et al. in [20] approach the electricity theft detection problem by de-
veloping an artificial intelligence technique, namely a support vector machine
(SVM). In this method historical consumption data and additional consumers
attributes are used to identify irregular consumption profiles that are highly cor-
related with NTL. The consumers are classified either as ”normal” or ”fraud”
by the SVM model. The consumers’ consumption patterns are determined by
employing data-mining and statistical analysis tools trying to identify sudden
changes in the consumption profiles. Specifically in this paper, the SVM solves a
binary classification problem by finding the optimal f(x) =sgn(g(x)), where g(x)
is the decision boundary between the two classes, that accurately classifies new
data into the two classes while minimizing the classification error. The method
of structural risk minimization is exploited. The method was tested using his-
torical data of three Malaysian cities for 265,870 customers and for 25 months.
The features that were eventually chosen include: a) 24 daily average energy
consumption values for each customer, which correspond to their load profile
(estimated as the monthly consumption divided by the number of days between
two consecutive measurements), and b) the credit worthiness information CWR
(this is produced by the utility’s billing system automatically for customers that
do not pay their bills) for each customer. The data were normalized, formatted
and then used for the training and testing of the SVM model. After collaboration
and on-site inspection with Tenaga Nasional Berhad, it was found out that the
expected hit rate increased from 3 % to 60 %.
In Nagi et al. [21] the work of [20] was extended, introducing a fuzzy infer-
ence system (FIS) in the form of IF-THEN rules. For each customer, an output
ranging from 0 to 1 is produced by the FIS. The customers with outputs from
0.5 and higher are considered to have higher probability to be fraudulent. This
method seemed to improve the previously 60 % hit rate to 72 %. It is worthy
to mention the work of [24], where a method to identify the features that best
describe possible illegal consumers is proposed.
Babu et al. in [22] use fuzzy C-Means clustering to categorize consumers
based on their consumption patterns. The difference of clustering to classification
is mainly that the latter one has a training dataset where the response of the
observations is already known and classifies new data. Clustering is the grouping
of observations into classes of similar objects. In fuzzy clustering, an observation
can belong to more than one class, with a different degree-of-membership. The
fraud identification relies on the fuzzy membership function and the normalized
Euclidean distances of cluster centers ordered by unitary index score. The highest
score represents fraudulent consumers. The method uses five attributes that are
considered to describe a consumption pattern. These attributes include: a) the
average consumption, b) the maximum consumption, c) the standard deviation
of consumption, d) the sum of inspection comments during the last six months,
and e) the average consumption of the neighborhood. Data of another twelve
months are required for the clustering process. The method was tested with real
data from one neighborhood with 57 consumers from India and it achieved a hit
rate of 80 %.
Faria et al. in [23] utilize the consumer baseline load calculation methods that
have been developed within the context of demand response. For each period of
the historical data, the expected consumption is estimated, then this is compared
with the realized one and if there is considerable difference the consumer is
characterized as a possibly fraudulent one. The baseline types that were used
are the following: a) type I, which uses load historical data and may include other
data such as weather, and b) type II, which is used for aggregated loads. After
the expected energy consumption calculation, statistics regarding the expected
and measured consumption are produced and compared. These statistics include
whole data average (WDAVG), whole data standard deviation (WDSTD), past
data average (PDAVG) and past data standard deviation (PDSTD). Whole data
refers to the overall data of the examined consumer, and past data refers to the
past data of each calculation period. The performance of the proposed method
is demonstrated by a case study.
3 Conclusions
Non-technical losses detection is a hard and challenging issue for the distribution
operators. With the massive deployment of SMs, new possibilities to detect elec-
tricity theft are opened up. This paper has discussed the challenging issues in
energy theft detection and provided some research directions. In addition, NTL
detection methods within AMI have been investigated and categorized in three
groups. After examination of existing approaches, it can be concluded that each
proposal addresses only a few aspects of the multidimensional problem of elec-
tricity theft. Therefore, the authors believe that energy-theft detection robust
methods of the future will include both system state-based techniques that lie in
the Kirchhoff laws applied to low voltage circuits and artificial-based methods
that lie in the detection of anomalies in the consumption pattern of consumers.
With the assistance of both methods, the weaknesses of each technique, related
mainly with lack of information, could be compensated successfully.
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